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THE FAMILY COURT: SOME SOCI-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
WILLIAM M. KEPHARTt
In 1899 the first juvenile court was established in Chicago, Illinois.
Less than a half-century later, juvenile courts had been launched in
every state of the union, and today these courts have become an in-
tegral part of American jurisprudence. The wholesale acceptance of
the juvenile court system within a time span of two generations is
somewhat surprising in view of the fact that: (a) changes in judicial
philosophy and legislative machinery, especially on a state-wide basis,
ordinarily are gradual, time-tested processes; and (b) it has never
been demonstrated that the juvenile court system is particularly suc-
cessful, in spite of its humanitarian base.
In 1914 the first family court was established in Cincinnati, Ohio.
Most of the other large cities followed suit, and in the last forty years
family court procedures have also been adopted in Omaha, St. Louis,
Detroit, Portland, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, Seattle, Dallas, and other
cities. However, the impetus for the family court was not so strong
as that for the juvenile court, and the former has not, as yet, received
the widespread acceptance accorded the latter. One reason for this is
because the evils which the juvenile court was designed to correct were
of a more flagrant nature than those generally correctable through
family court procedures. Nevertheless, thie family court movement is
accelerating. More and more, law journals, social science publications,
and even daily newspapers are carrying articles describing family
court functions., Perhaps "advocating" would be a more appropriate
word as I do not recall reading an article attacking the family court.
In any case, the purpose of the present paper is to subject the family
court to a critical analysis and to bring into clearer focus some of its
socio-legal inferences. While the family court movement is relatively
new compared to that of the juvenile court, there are both operational
and, more important, conceptual similarities between the two courts.
As a matter of fact, the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in some areas
has been extended to include parents as well as children, and it was
this extension of jurisdictional authority which was one of the factors
t Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania.
1. See, e.g., Alexander, What is a Family Court, Anyway?, 26 CoNN. B.3. 243(1952); Chute, Divorce and the Family Court, 18 LAw & CONTnMP. PROD. 49L 1953); Edwards, Toward a Family Court for Wayne County, 16 U. DEMroIT
.J. 169 (1953); Johnstone Family Courts, 22 KAN. CITY L. REv. 18 (1953);
Ogburn, The Role of Legal gervices in Family Stability, 272 ANNALS 127 (1950);
Samuels, Courts for the Family Go on Trial, N. Y. Times Dec. 20, 1953, Mag. See.
pp. 1643.
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leading to the development of the integrated family court. In the fol-
lowing analysis the implications of this philosophical parallelism be-
tween the two courts will, I hope, become apparent.
FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY COURT
While the juvenile courts in the United States vary widely in opera-
tional procedures, there is, theoretically at least, a more or less agreed
upon set of principles. These principles are embodied in a part of the
legal philosophy of parens patride, i.e., the state, through the juvenile
court, assumes the necessary parental responsibilities for delinquent
children, who, presumably, are being neglected by their real parents.
Thus, delinquent children are accorded the same protection and guid-
ance as neglected children, and the relationship becomes that of par-
ent-and-child rather than that of the "Commonwealth v. "
"Family" courts vary even more widely than do juvenile courts,
both in function and in name. Most courts which are designated as
Family Courts or Domestic Relations Courts are not integrated fam-
ily courts. For the most part, such courts deal with segmental aspects
of family. problems, i.e., some handle desertion cases and cases involv-
ing non-support-of indigent parents, others have only juvenile juris-
diction, etc. The true family court. on the other hand, is a court
which is empowered and staffed to handle all family problems of a
justiciable nature. As thus conceived, the family court would handle
annulment, divorce, alimony, desertion and nonsupport, custody, adop-
tion, neglect, bastardy, intra-family conduct problems, juvenile de-
linquency, etc. The Ohio courts referred to are true family courts and,
in effect, often serve as models for courts in other areas.
Since they operate in a multi-function capacity, family courts em-
ploy a wider range of personnel than do other courts. These may in-
clude probation officers and supervisors, psychiatric social workers,
clinical psychologists and psychometrists, nurses, pediatricians, in-
vestigators, psychiatrists, administrative officers, referees, and mar-
riage counselors.
Philosophically,.the family court is to the family what the juvenile
court is to the child. Operating more or- less on the assumption that
intra-family conflicts result from personality factors, environmental
conditions or a combination of both,-the court tries to resolve family
difficulties, to get at the roots of inter-personal conflicts, to offer guid-
ance and professional help, and in general to preserve family ties.
There are a variety of perspectives regarding the family court-so
many, in fact, that any detailed classification would be arbitrary. For
the sake of convenience the various viewpoints can be summarized
under three broad headings: (1) Administrative, (2) Statistical, and
(3) Socio-legal.
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE PERSPECTIVE
One of the most frequently heard arguments favoring a family court
is that involving administration and record keeping. In an integrated
family court all family cases are heard under one jurisdiction and
under one roof. Without such a court there is bound to be jurisdic-
tional overlapping and some loss of efficiency due to compartmental
record keeping. In New York City, for example, no fewer than six
courts handle family matters: The Supreme Court (divorce, annul-
ment, custody); Special Sessions (illegitimate children); Family
Court (support claims) ; Children's Court (delinquency and neglect);
Surrogate's Court (adoptions) ; and Home Term (disorderly conduct
within the family). In most of our large cities three or more separate
courts have jurisdiction over marriage and the family, and in nearly
all instances no liaison or cross-reference procedures are utilized.
However, there is more to this administrative argument than meets
the eye, especially in the area of divorce. What is too often minimized
is the fact that our present divorce system aims at protecting the in-
terests of the state as well as the rights of the individual, that is:
While an action to dissolve a marital relationship is nominally
between two parties, the state, because of its concern in maintain-
ing the marriage relation, unless good cause is shown for its dis-
solution, is an interested party. It has been recognized ... that it
is really a triangular proceeding, in which the husband, the wife,
and the state are involved. While the state does not necessarily
oppose, it is the duty of a court to see that when an attempt is
made to sever the relation it shall not prevail without sufficient
and lawful cause shown by the real facts on which the state per-
mits a divorce to be granted, and to discover and defeat any at-
tempted collusion and fraud. There is a liberal legal discretion
vested in the courts to accomplish this purpose.2
It follows that the interests of the state can best be maintained,
theoretically at least, under a procedure which utilizes all the available
material relevant to a divorce suit. In practice, however, divorce ac-
tions-the occasional contested cases excepted-have tended more and
more to become cut-and-dried affairs aimed at fulfilling the letter
rather than the spirit of the law. No serious attempt at investigation
is made since "no one seems to want'it that way."' In view of the
loose socio-legal attitude toward divorce existing today, it is difficult
to see how the interests of the state would be furthered simply by
having all relevant family records centralized. In all likelihood, the
divorce mill would grind on in a family court as it does under divorce
procedures where a family court has not been established. Of course,
there are other arguments favoring a family court that can be raised,
2. Hall v. Hall, 122 Pa. Super. 242, 246, 186 Atl. 318, 320 (1936).
3. See, e.g., The Administration of Divorce: A Philadelphia Study, 101 U. oF
PA. L. Rsv. 1204 (1953).
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e.g., the process of marriage counseling, the treatment of juvenile de-
linquents, etc., but these functions must be judged solely on their
effectiveness, and I shall attempt an evaluation of this kind in a later
section of this paper.
It can be argued that the centralization of administration and rec-
ords that would obtain in a family court would result in a lower over-
all court budget. This argument is true as far as it goes, but such
financial savings would be insignificant when compared to the other
costs involved in operating an integrated family court. For instance,
full-scale services alone would include increased probation and psychi-
atric staffs, referees, investigators, marriage counselors, and others,
and the cost for such services comes high.
Administrative centralization as found in a family court would be
a convenience to lawyers, judges, and others who upon occasion must
divide their time in-different buildings. Centralization would also tend
to eliminate conflicts of jurisdiction. The importance of this latter
argument depends, of course, upon the prevalence of jurisdictional
disputes in the state wherein a family court is being proposed.
II. STATISTICAL INFORMATION
A second argument favoring a family court is one which, to the best
of my knowledge, has not been presented heretofore. I refer to the
gathering of statistical information, with special, reference to the
kinds of data from which "causal" inferences can be drawn relative to
marital disruption. It is recognized that "solutions" to problems of
crime, delinquency, divorce, mental illness, alcoholism, etc., hinge on
the isolation of the cause or causes which produce these problems, and
social scientists devote a staggering amount of time in a quest for the
causative and associative factors involved. Our job, as social scien-
tists, is made most difficult because of the general apathy which exists
with respect to the recording and reporting of relevant statistical in-
formation. For example, it would be desirable to know to what extent
divorce is associated with such factors as youthful marriages, or
mixed-religious marriages, or marriages wherein the parties come
from different socio-economic backgrounds or different educational
levels. Statistical analysis of a sufficient number of these factors
would provide for a clearer understanding of the whole divorce prob-
lem. Unfortunately we do not have satisfactory data on any of the
foregoing factors which would permit us to draw valid generalizations.
Aside from numerical totals, there are no national marriage and
divorce statistics along the lines mentioned above. The National Office
of Vital Statistics publishes a wealth of material on births, deaths, and
morbidity factors, but little or nothing which would aid in an under-
standing of the divorce problem. Similarly, the United States Bureau
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss1/7
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of the Census gathers and publishes detailed information about the
characteristics of the population-even including an item on whether
or not there is a flush toilet on the premises-but virtually nothing
dealing with divorce. A family court, on the other hand, would pro-
vide an ideal statistical laboratory for the collection and analysis of
information pertaining to marital failure.
Recognizing the need for statistical information on divorce, the
Philadelphia Bar Association Committee on Marriage and Divorce
Laws and Family Court arranged, in 1951, for a study of Philadelphia
divorce records. The study was made possible through the thought-
fulness of the Honorable Curtis Bok, President Judge of Common
Pleas Court No. 6, who granted permission to examine the divorce
records of that court. Because of my own interests in the field of
marriage and family life, I was asked to make the statistical analysis
of the records. Our study was based on a sample of some 1500 divorce
records. Despite the more or less exploratory nature of the project, a
wealth of valuable information was collected and analyzed-informa-
tion relating divorce to such factors as age-at-marriage and age differ-
ences, children, religion, socio-economic status, race, nativity, and the
remarriage factor. A good bit of this material has already been pub-
lished in various professional journals.'
One thing we learned from the study was the impracticality of
transcribing statistical information from divorce records. Despite the
smallness of our sample, it took many months of unrolling thick wads
of divorce testimony before the necessary data were transcribed on
statistical cards. Under a family court, divorce records-as well as
family files-would contain, ideally, a summary or face sheet from
which the necessary statistical transcription to I.B.M. cards becomes
a routine matter. Desired information could then be obtained by mak-
ing the pertinent runs on an I.B.M. machine. Of course, a divorce-
reporting system of this kind would not require a family court. Such
a system could be established in any court. Clearly, however, a family
court wherein data on all family matters are recorded provides the
most effective statistical laboratory for the study of family-related
problems.
There is one serious flaw in the "statistical" argument; namely, the
integrated family courts already in existence do iiot, in general, utilize
the statistical method. Despite the reams of material that have been
4. Kephart, Drinking and Marital Disruption, 15 Q.J. OF STUDIES ON ALCOHOL
63 (1954); Kephart and Monahan, Desertion and Divorce in Philadelphia, 17
AM. SOCIOLOGIcAL REV. 719 (1952); Kephart and Monahan, Some Variables in
Cases of Reported Sexual Maladjustment, 16 MARRRIAGE & FAMILY LIVING 241
(1954); Monahan and Kephart, Divorce and Desertion by Religious and Mixed-
Religious Groups, 59 A.MY. J. OF SoctLoGY 454 (1954); Kephart and Strohm, The
Stability of Gretna Green Marriages, 36 SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL RESEARCH 291(1953).
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written about the Ohio courts, for example, so far as I am aware no
divorce statistics have emanated from these social experiments. Ap-
parently family courts are making no attempt to build a solidified,
factual body of knowledge which could be utilized as an aid to under-
standing and solving the very problems for which the courts were
created! The fact that the extant family courts have not yielded any
substantive information relative to such problems as divorce and fam-
ily conflicts stands as a serious omission in the organization of the
family court system. This fact-finding failure should be assessed by
bar association groups who are considering the advisability of creat-
ing family courts in areas where such courts do not now exist.
III. SOCIO-LEGAL ASPECTS
The ultimate test of family courts-indeed, the test of all socio-legl
experiments-is "Do They Work?" The two criterion-questions might
be phrased somewhat as follows: (1) Do family courts actually solve
justiciable family problems? (2) Do these courts safeguard the in-
terests of the state Let us examine each of these questions separately.
1. Do family courts solve justiciable family problems?
This is a difficult question to answer inasmuch as the courts do not
provide us with figures whereby their effectiveness can be measured.
For example, we know little or nothing about the value of marriage
counseling as it is practiced in family courts. We are not told what per
cent of the couples coming to court are reconciled or what per cent of
those reconciled remain reconciled. I am familiar with statements to
the effect that under a family court system thirty per cent of the di-
vorce suits are withdrawn, but so far as I can discover this is about the
same per cent withdrawn in a regular court.
In the absence of statistical and research information which might
substantiate some of the otherwise extravagant claims made by pro-
ponents of the family court, there has arisen a fairly extensive body
of verbally eloquent, albeit non-documented, literature. Extolling the
alleged virtues of the family court, this material abounds in legal
journals and is usually, though not always, written by members of the
judiciary or legal personnel connected with such a court, or by social
workers directly or potentially involved in family court procedures.
There is nothing wrong with salesmanship of this kind; in fact, the
pleading of one's case in the absence of supportable facts is an old
human custom and privilege. Some lawyers make a practice of it, and
so do some social "scientists." When it comes to reading articles per-
taining to social problems, however, lawyers are at somewhat of a
disadvantage in trying to distinguish between scientific and pseudo-
scientific content since, unlike social scientists, they have not been
trained to evaluate the validity of modern research methods. For
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example, in reading law review articles advocating the extension of
the juvenile court or the establishment of a family court, I am struck
by the prevalence of the case-history method. To use a fictional illus-
tration:
Johnny Brown, age 14, and his sister Barbara, age 12, were
caught breaking into a local grocery store. They admitted having
broken into a variety of neighborhood stores, stealing both money
and merchandise. At the Delinquent Study Center of the Family
Court both children stated that the reason they had been rob-
bing stores was that their mother told them they were not wanted
around the house. The mother, upon being interviewed by the
psychiatric social worker, denied this, but admitted that occasion-
ally she would ask the children to leave the house-but this was
only when she saw that her husband was getting drunk. The
psychiatric social worker then called on the husband, who denied
getting drunk, although he admitted that once or twice a week he
"would take a drink or tvo"; however, he stated that he had
"never laid a finger on either the wife or the children." It was
explained to him that his drinking was creating feelings of anxi-
ety on the part of his wife, and that this feeling was being trans-
mitted to the children, who then took to robbing stores to allay
their anxiety feelings. The husband stopped drinking, the wife
lost her anxiety, and Johnny and Barbara have taken an active
interest in clay modeling.
No matter how heart-rending the story, the case-history approach
has little research value unless it provides hypotheses which can then
be tested statistically on large numbers of cases. If the number is
large enough-thousands of cases for instance, important variables
such as sex, age, I.Q., race, neighborhood, type of offense, etc., can be
controlled so as to yield vital information about the factor being
studied, e.g., anxiety feelings. Taken by itself, a given case-history has
little research value since there is no way of controlling the necessary
variables; to put it another way, an individual case-history can be
chosen so as to "prove" most any point. Despite the almost self-evi-
dent limitations involved, the I-know-a-case approach continues to be
the stock-in-trade of marriage counselors, psychiatrists, social work-
ers, and others engaged in remedial family-problem work. Judging
from the frequency with which this approach appears in law journals,
and judging from the zeal of some bar association groups in support-
ing the family court movement in spite of the lack of positive statisti-
cal evidence, it is apparent that the legal profession has been greatly
influenced by the family-life "experts."
Exactly how important this "influence" is can be seen from the fact
that juvenile and family court work has been largely taken over by
social workers-despite their lack of demonstrated success. As John-
stone points out:
Juvenile courts have become social workers' courts. Probation
and parole, when not dominated by politics, are dominated by
Washington University Open Scholarship
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social workers... [and] [e] xcept for law-yers, social workers are
the most important professional group in the operation of the
legal process today.5
I am not contending that social work groups have failed in their court
endeavors, but I do maintain that on the basis of existing data their
success cannot be demonstrated. As a matter of fact, any one who is
familiar with the work of psychiatrists, social workers, probation offi-
cers, marriage counselors, and similar groups, must be aware by now
that those are not scientific pursuits; nor is any integrated effort be-
ing made in this direction, except at the verbal level. By and large,
these groups are not building a verifiable body of knowledge which
can be applied to the solving of behavior problems of the type they
routinely handle. In the case of psychiatry or marriage counseling, it
is likely that some of the individuals dealt with are helped; it is quite
possible that some are hurt; for the bulk of cases, however, no one
knows what the results are since large-scale follow-up studies are not
undertaken. In the absence of publishable findings in the form of
rigidly controlled research efforts, marriage counseling, social work,
and psychiatric journals, for the most part, are devoted to run-downs
based on the I-know-a-case method. A professional phraseology or
jargon is developed, and slogans and verbal cliches are then passed on
from one annual meeting to the next.
There are exceptions, of course, in all of the above-mentioned fields.
The Philadelphia Marriage Council, under the direction of Dr. Emily
Mudd, has made serious efforts to compile a body of empirical findings
with the hope that they can ultimately be utilized to solve marital case-
problems that are faced by the counseling staff. John Reinemann,
Director of Probation for the Philadelphia Municipal Court, also has
been a staunch advocate of the statistical-research approach. Further-
more, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the kinds of court
problems faced by marriage counselors, psychiatrists, and social work
groups are immensely complex.
When all is said and done, however, the original question, "Do fam-
ily courts solve justiciable family problems?", when faced squarely,
cannot at the present time be answered in the affirmative. Statistical
and other research evidence from sources best able to supply the evi-
dence-the existing family courts-is lacking. Similarly, in regard to
the juvenile court, the question cannot be answered in the affirmative,
for here too, statistical confirmation is lacking. The hope that was held
out by the Chicago group which established the first juvenile court
fifty-five years ago has as yet failed to materialize. While a more de-
tailed analysis will be given in the next section, it might be mentioned
5. Johnstone, supra note 1, at 21, 22.
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in passing that a large percentage of all juvenile delinquents continue
to be "repeaters." And in recent years delinquency rates have risen.
I am not suggesting that recidivism and deliquency-increases are to
be blamed on social work groups, nor do I wish to be overly critical of
these groups. For the most part these are sincere, hard-working, often
harried people, working under much-less-than-ideal conditions. And
it should be kept in mind, in this connection, that delinquency and
family disruption are so complex that no one has yet pinned down
specific causes. But I do think that the burden of proof should be borne
by these groups. I do not think it is up to me-or you-to demonstrate
the failings of the family court. I think it is up to the proponents of
family courts to demonstrate their success.
2. Do family courts safeguard the interests of the state?
The assumption here is that it is in the interests of the state to
foster and maintain a strong family system, and that when individual
family ties are weakened, the state, and therefore all the citizens
thereof, is also weakened. Let us take two examples, presumably, of
family breakdown-divorce and delinquency-and explore the role of
the family court in each.
(a) With respect to divorce, family courts, through the marriage
counseling service, could, in theory, serve the interests of the state
by "saving" a certain percentage of marriages which might other-
wise have terminated. In practice, since these courts conduct no fol-
low-up studies relative to the effectiveness of the marriage counseling
or conciliation service, and since no statistics are published relative to
other phases of counseling, it is impossible to determine whether
the state's interests are actually being served. In this respect the
goal is without a doubt a very worthy one, and it can be argued that
no matter how small the percentage of saved marriages, the state
would benefit. Of course, if this percentage were quite small, the ques-
tion would resolve itself into one of expense: Can the state afford the
vast expenditures involved in a family court in view of the negligible
return in the form of a few preserved marriages? If the percentage of
saved marriages were large, the cost of the court would be money well
spent. It is most unfortunate that we have no actual figures to guide
us in making a decision; in fact, my own views on the family court
have been dimmed in recent years as I have searched in vain for
figures.
One further socio-legal point is involved in connection with the
state's interest in divorce. There is no common law regulating divorce,
Divorce proceedings are products of statutes. Therefore, what would
happen in the event the marriage counselor, after hearing both sides
of a deep-seated marital rift, recommended to the family court judge
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if a divorce
were granted-even though, the legal ground (adultery in the state of
New York, for example) did not exist? Since the judge would be
powerless in this instance, the action of the marriage counselor might
well represent an "official" invitation to collusion or to an out-of-state
divorce!
(b) With regard to the problem of delinquency, the philosophy of
the family court is more or less identical with that of the juvenile
court; namely, that the interests of the state are most effectively
safeguarded if delinquent children are considered to be the misguided
products of adverse social conditions rather than as criminals. The
state (through the family court) thus protects itself through the
doctrine of parens patriae-guiding the child, parent-wise, into ave-
nues of proper citizenship and social adjustment. As it relates to
delinquency, then, the question ("Do family courts safeguard the
interests of the state?") can best be answered in light of the fifty-five
year old record of the juvenile court.
It cannot be demonstrated that the juvenile court has safeguarded
the interests of the state, and there are some who would consider
this a severe understatement There is no question in my own mind but
that the juvenile court has failed, although some doubt remains as to
why it has failed. In general, there are two kinds of arguments, and,
for the sake of convenience, they can be labelled Arot Enough and Too
Much.
Not Enough. According to this argument the philosophy of the ju-
venile court-parns patriae-is quite sound; in fact, it is the only
philosophy which is compatible with democratic concepts of human
rights. The trouble lies in the fact that the philosophy has never really
been put into practice. In many states the authority over juvenile
offenders resides in courts that primarily serve other functions. The
"juvenile" operation, therefore, is often peripheral. Even in courts
technically designated as "juvenile courts"' the philosophy and treat-
ment are strikingly similar to that of the conventional criminal court,
i.e., the juvenile is considered to be a "criminal" and is treated as such,
with probation, supervisory treatment, and guidance at a minimum.
In many states the upper age limits for juveniles-15, 16, or 17-are
thought to be too low, with youth in their late teens and early
twenties being deprived of juvenile jurisdiction at a time in life they
are most in need of it. Finally, even in the most progressive and best
equipped juvenile courts, there is a serious shortage of personnel.
Probation officers, counselors, and social workers are forced to operate
under a work-load so heavy that individual treatment must be sacri-
ficed for assembly-line expediency.
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Too Much. Proponents of this point of view, who, I would judge,
comprise a rather small minority among both lawyers and social
scientists, also advocate humane treatment for juvenile and youthful
offenders. They object strongly, however, to the blanket assumption
that youth, because they are youth, are in no way responsible for
criminal conduct. The argument is that once the doctrine of individual
responsibility is buried the best interests of the state cannot possibly
be safeguarded. Increases in juvenile delinquency are but one symp-
tom of the permissive, coddling attitude of the courts. The price that
society has to pay for the rehabilitation of only some delinquents is, in
over-all effect, too high. Knowing of the court's feathery approach,
knowing that they will be "treated" or "studied" in a juvenile or
youth center, knowing that the threat of imprisonment is indeed re-
mote, young offenders are thus encouraged to feed criminally from the
societal hand that caresses them. The job of the court then becomes
that of fixing blame-on parents, on teachers, on slum conditions, on
society itself-any place but on the individual. Instead of dealing with
the youthful offender in court, where he can perhaps be made to
realize the gravity of his offense, he is indulged informally by the
judge in the latter's chambers, or, more likely, never sees the judge
but, together with his parents, is interviewed by a social worker, a
psychiatrist, or both. Nowhere is any real effort made to look out for
society's interests; in fact, delinquents often cannot be fingerprinted
nor, except under extreme circumstances, can they be jailed. Thus,
the job of the police becomes largely that of re-apprehending the re-
leased products of "rehabilitation."
IS THE FAMILY COURT A WORTHWHILE VENTURE?
On the basis of the available evidence, to summarize, it cannot be
demonstrated that the family court is doing much in the way of solv-
ing family problems, nor can it be shown that the interests of the
state are being safeguarded. In these respects I have a final comment
or two to make. Proponents of the "Not Enough" school maintain
that one of the main reasons the juvenile and family courts are failing
is because these courts are seriously understaffed. So far as I can
discover there is not a single juvenile or family court in the United
States that is adequately staffed, nor is there much likelihood, in the
foreseeable future, that any will be. It appears that financially the
cost is too high. If this is so, then the argument between the "Not
Enough" and "Too MNuch" schools of thought becomes at least partly
academic, since, in practice, the courts fail in both instances.
Another question I should like to raise deals with the underlying
assumption of the group of men who inaugurated the first juvenile
court at the close of the last century: delinquent children should be
Washington University Open Scholarship
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treated like dependent or neglected children. The implication is that
the youthful offender violates the law because of adverse social condi-
tions, e.g., parental abuse, economic poverty, and the like. There was
apparently no recognition of the possibility that some youthful offend-
ers, by virtue of their inherent makeup, may have become deviants for
reasons that cannot be attributed predominantly to adverse "social"
conditions. Moreover, while it would be less than humane to apply the
same standards of culpability to both adults and children, I cannot but
wonder whether the categorical assumption of nonresponsibility has
perhaps encouraged irresponsibility. Clearly, there must be a balance
between the interests of any one group-children or otherwise--and
the interest of society as a whole, and I would question whether this
balance has been struck. Inasmuch as the family court is more or less
a jurisdictional extension of the juvenile court, this question of bal-
ance becomes quite important.
With regard to'the marriage counseling or conciliation service that
the family court utilizes in divorce and potential-divorce cases, the
goal is laudatory in that it aims at furthering the interests of the in-
dividual as well as the state. The only question to be answered per-
tains to results: Does marriage counseling actually prevent divorces,
and if so, is this percentage significant enough to warrant the financial
expenditures inherent in the operation of a family court?
As a sociologist, I believe that, in the long run, there is much to be
recommended in the establishment of family courts. Eventually, when
more is known about human behavioral problems, especially as they
relate to family conflict, family courts should have little difficulty in
justifying their own existence. In the immediate future, and for the
present, family courts also serve a useful experimental purpose, and
it is on this basis that they must be assessed. In this respect I would
suggest that the state and local bar associations which are interested
in the establishment of family courts in their areas appoint commit-
tees to study objectively the results of the already existing juvenile
and family courts. I include "juvenile" here because many of these
courts, in practice, are fairly similar to family courts. Irrespective of
the name they go by, courts which handle family problems are suffi-
ciently diverse both conceptually and procedurally, to provide objec-
tive examining groups with relevant information. To such examining
groups I would suggest the following type of check-questions: (1)
What kind of statistics does the court publish? (2) Are there any
figures to indicate the effects of the marriage counseling service: Have
divorce and desertion rates decreased as the marriage counseling ser-
vice has expanded? Are these rates lower than those in comparable
areas that do not mailitain a family court? (3) What percentage of
the juvenile offenders coming before the court are repeaters? (4) Is
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss1/7
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the juvenile "guidance" or "educational" program producing tangible
results? How do the results of these programs compare with those of
courts which do not operate a "guidance" program? (5) Is there a
balance between the legal and "social" aspects of the court: Are the
interests of the state as well as those of the individual being safe-
guarded? (6) What is the estimated cost of the court to the tax-
payer? (7) Is the cost commensurate with the results?
There is no need to extend the list. In general, an examining group
should endeavor to compare or contrast demonstrated results of vari-
ous aspects of a family court against those in a comparable area which
does not maintain a court of this kind, with the degree of difference
balanced against the financial outlay as the criterion. It is not an easy
task. I am fully aware of the difficulties involved in temporal and
regional comparisons. At the same time, before supporting an expen-
sive social experiment like the family court, bar associations should
require some tangible proof of success. To repeat, it is not up to you
or me to demonstrate failure; it is up to the proponents of family
courts to demonstrate their success.
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